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IGAs vs. MAATM: 
Has Tax Bilateralism Outlived Its Usefulness? 
 
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah1 
Gil Savir2 
 
 
In 2010, the United States began a revolution in international taxation of 
individuals when it enacted the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, or FATCA. 
FATCA was a response to the UBS scandal, in which it was revealed that UBS was 
aiding and abetting tax evasion by US citizens despite being a trusted “qualified 
intermediary” of the IRS.3 In response, FATCA imposed a 30% withholding tax on the 
US source income of any “foreign financial institution” that is found not to have shared 
information on its account holders who are US citizens or residents. 
 
FATCA created an outcry among the foreign banks and other financial 
institutions, for two main reasons. First, the banks claimed that it imposed unreasonable 
compliance costs on them. The fundamental problem stems from the fact that the US has 
since 1861 taxed its citizens living permanently overseas, and as a result, FATCA applies 
to many such expatriates who have no intention of hiding their income from the IRS (in 
fact, most of them do not owe any taxes to the US because of the earned income 
exclusion of IRC section 9114 and the foreign tax credit of IRC section 9015). The 
solution to that is to stop taxing citizens living overseas, as the first author has argued.6 
 
The second problem with FATCA was that many foreign countries have taxpayer 
confidentiality laws that preclude banks from sharing account information with the IRS. 
Under the modern version of article 26 of the tax treaties and under tax information 
exchange (TIEA) agreements, such prohibitions should not bar the exchange of 
information, but many treaties have not been updated to reflect the new norms. Thus, the 
banks argued that they faced a serious dilemma of either violating the laws of their home 
country or being subjected to the FATCA penalty. 
 
The US Treasury responded by negotiating a series of Intergovernmental 
Agreements (IGAs) with the governments of various countries with which the US has 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Irwin	  I.	  Cohn	  Professor	  of	  Law,	  the	  University	  of	  Michigan.	  2	  SJD	  candidate,	  the	  University	  of	  Michigan.	  3	  Avi-­‐Yonah,	  Reuven	  S.,	  What	  Goes	  Around	  Comes	  Around:	  Why	  the	  US	  is	  Responsible	  for	  Capital	  Flight	  (and	  What	  
it	  Can	  Do	  about	  It)	  (January	  23,	  2013).	  U	  of	  Michigan	  Public	  Law	  Research	  Paper	  No.	  307.	  Available	  at	  SSRN:	  http://ssrn.com/abstract=2208553	  or	  http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2208553	  4	  I.R.C. § 911; See also IRS,Foreign Earned Income Exclusion – Requirements,	  http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/International-­‐Taxpayers/Foreign-­‐Earned-­‐Income-­‐Exclusion-­‐-­‐-­‐Requirements	  5	  I.R.C. § 901  - “Foreign Tax Credit”	  6	  Avi-­‐Yonah,	  Reuven	  S.,	  The	  Case	  Against	  Taxing	  Citizens	  (March	  25,	  2010).	  U	  of	  Michigan	  Law	  &	  Econ,	  Empirical	  Legal	  Studies	  Center	  Paper	  No.	  10-­‐009;	  U	  of	  Michigan	  Public	  Law	  Working	  Paper	  No.	  190.	  Available	  at	  SSRN:	  http://ssrn.com/abstract=1578272	  or	  http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1578272	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either a tax treaty or a TIEA. Under the IGAs, it is the responsibility of the foreign 
government to collect the necessary information from its banks and transmit it to the IRS. 
In return, under some IGAs the US has agreed to do the same for the foreign government, 
i.e., collect information on its residents who have accounts in US banks and share it with 
the foreign government. The difference, of course, is that the US is the only country that 
taxes its citizens living overseas, so it has many more taxpayers with accounts in foreign 
financial institutions than the foreign country is likely to have in US banks. 
 
It is not clear that the IGAs are permitted under FATCA, since the legislation 
clearly requires direct submission of the information by the FFIs to the IRS. Nor is it 
clear that Treasury had the authority to enter into IGAs under the tax treaties and TIEAs.7 
But the main concern about the IGAs is that they enshrine the bilateral model of tax 
information exchange that has dominated the 20th century. Unfortunately, there are good 
reasons to believe this bilateral model does not work, especially when IGAs are signed 
with countries like the Cayman Islands8 who have no interest in reciprocity and every 
interest in making them not work. 
 
Instead, there is an alternative. In response to the financial crisis and the outrage it 
caused in Europe about tax evasion by the wealthy, the OECD has proposed a 
Multilateral Agreement for Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters9 (MAATM), which 
has by now over [75]10 signatory countries. The MAATM provides for automatic 
exchange of information and because it is multilateral it overcomes the problem of non-
reciprocity that bedevils the tax treaties, bilateral TIEAs, and the IGAs. 
 
In what follows, we will argue that the MAATM model is superior, and that 
therefore the US and OECD should abandon tax information exchange and administrative 
assistance under articles 26 and 27 of the tax treaties, as well as bilateral TIEAs and 
IGAs, and instead commit to the MAATM. 
 
Tax Evasion 
 
As technology has evolved dramatically in recent years, it is easier today more 
than ever for both companies and individuals to shift income and capital among countries 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Christians, Allison, The Dubious Legal Pedigree of IGAs (and Why it Matters) (February 
11, 2013). Tax Notes International, Vol. 69, No. 6, 2013. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2280508	  8	  For list of TIEAs see http://www.oecd.org/ctp/harmful/taxinformationexchangeagreementstieas.htm (last visited Feb. 
5, 2014). 9	  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], Convention on Mutual 
Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters  2011 [hereinafter MAATM]. Available at  
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/ENG-Amended-Convention.pdf 	  10	  For	  list	  of	  countries	  that	  singed	  on	  the	  MAAATM	  convention	  see	  http://www.eoi-­‐tax.org/multilateral_agreements/fe15bbbd33dc02b34816e64335556653#default	  (75	  countries	  singed	  the	  MAATM	  convention.	  However,	  about	  32	  countries,	  e.g.	  the	  U.S.,	  have	  signed	  the	  convention	  but	  not	  yet	  ratified	  it).	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in order to reduce their global tax amount by using tax haven jurisdictions. This 
phenomenon has been recognized by the OECD as a “Harmful Tax Competition”11. The 
ability of individuals to shift their capital income without being taxed is subject to 
substantial limitations12. However, the possibility still exists, especially in situations 
where the taxpayer relies on the lack of information-sharing between different countries 
around the world13 by not reporting their income14. Ever since the OECD members 
officially recognized the problem in 1998, a significant effort has been made to force 
those tax haven countries to share their information15 about foreign taxpayers who utilize 
the lack of information exchanges between countries, while enabling the tax havens16 to 
enjoy the investment of capital in their jurisdiction. 
 
The “Tax Justice Network”, a non-profit organization, set itself a goal to promote 
the recognition that the lack of transparency is a major problem for developed countries, 
out of which there is usually a flow of capital.  To get a perspective about the size of the 
problem, in 2002 the organization released a report that the amount of equity held 
offshore by individuals alone was about $11.5 trillion, with a resulting annual loss of 
about $250 billion in taxes, which “is five times what the World Bank estimated in 2002 
was needed to address the UN Millenium Development Goal of halving world poverty by 
2015”17. According to the United Nation Office on Drugs and Crimes, the “hidden” 
money from criminal activities, corruption, and tax evasion is estimated at between $1 
trillion and $1.6 trillion per year. As has been recognized before, the effect on the U.S 
treasury is also significant18. A study conducted by the Congressional Research Service 
(CRS) indicates that tax evasion by individuals alone through setting up foreign 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. [OECD] (1998). Harmful Tax Competition: An 
Emerging Global Issue. Data retrieved February 5, 2010 from http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/. [hereinafter OECD 
Harmful Tax Competition]. (Under the OECD definition for tax havens, a country that does not share information 
about transactions that occurred within its jurisdiction is also a potential tax haven). 
12 Avi-Yonah, Reuven S., "And Yet it Moves: A Tax Paradigm for the 21st Century" (Law & Economics Working 
Papers. Paper 59, 2013). available at  http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/59 
13 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The OECD Harmful Tax Competition Report: A 10th Anniversary Retrospective, (U. Mich. 
Program in Law and Econ., Working Paper No. 89, 2008), available at http://law.bepress.com/umichlwps-olin/art89.  
14 Jane G. Gravelle, Tax Havens: International tax avoidance and evasion, (Congressional Research Service, Library of 
Congress, 2009), available at http://heinonlinebackup.com/hol-cgi-
bin/get_pdf.cgi?handle=hein.tera/crstax0642&section=1. 
15 Avi-Yonah, supra note, 13 at 3. 
16 The OECD recognized that a country that does not provide information about its taxpayers is also a tax haven. 
17 See http://www.taxjustice.net. 
18 Avi-Yonah, supra note, 13 at 13. 
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corporations in tax havens and channeling the income to these foreign companies, results 
in an estimated $70 billion a year deficit to the U.S. treasury19.  
 
Lack of information 
 
As the world become borderless, countries are faced with problems enforcing 
their local tax laws. As a result, tax evasion has become a central concern of the major 
economies around the world20. Hand in hand with the double taxation convention, the 
global finance system has developed agreements for the exchange of information in order 
to increase the ability of their tax systems (both civil and criminal) to enforce their rules 
on sophisticated taxpayers21. A primary goal set by the OECD in the last decades is the 
war against countries whose lack of transparency allows them to function as a 
comfortable place to route income, without enabling other countries to track this 
income.22.  
 
A report released by Avi-Yonah, “The OECD Harmful Tax Competition Report: 
A 10th Anniversary Retrospective”23 indicates that the OECD has achieved significant 
progress in the field of information exchange over the last decade. However, lack of 
transparency is still a major problem in the global field. In our opinion, as long as some 
countries continue to provide tax shelters to taxpayers, the OECD may win the battle but 
will lose the war, resulting in the need for an alternative solution. Our opinion is based on 
two factors: First, the assumption that in a competitive financial world, some countries 
will always be willing to host trillions of dollars in order to achieve investment in their 
infrastructure. The second factor is sophisticated internal law, such as exists in the British 
Virgin Islands (BVI)24. As of 2010, the BVI population stood at 29,537. However, more 
than 400,000 companies were incorporated under BVI law. The assumption of the 
Congressional Research in its article is the fact that the local laws in the BVI “require no 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Jane G. Gravelle, supra note, 14. 
20 See the first paragraph, for a description of the problem,. 
21Kevin Jestin, Harmfu Mutual Legal Assistance In Tax Matters Recent Trends and Challenge Ahead (2008), 
available at http://visar.csustan.edu/aaba/Jestin2008.pdf 
22 Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue, supra note, 11. 
23 Avi-Yonah, supra note 2, at 5-7. 
24 Jane G. Gravelle, supra note 14, at 22.  
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identification of shareholders or directors, and require no financial records”25. Thus, even 
if the country provides information about its taxpayers, no real valuable information can 
be found26, so the taxpayer has no real concerns. 
 
Though the lack of transparency is still a major problem, in our opinion the ability 
to track unreported income is increasing under those agreements, due to the countries’ 
option to track the source of the income. In the event of income “disappearing” without 
reporting it to the suitable tax authority (or to any authority at all), a flag should be raised. 
Based on our assumption, we will briefly review the existing bilateral treaties and Tax 
Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs) of the U.S. and the OECD. 
 
With the above problem in mind, the U.S. started signing TIEAs with countries 
around the world27. In order to create a wide network of information exchange, the U.S. 
has over 60 bilateral treaties that include articles dealing with the exchange of 
information. These treaties usually allow exchange of both civil and criminal 
information28. In addition, where a treaty is not in place, the U.S. has signed TIEAs with 
over 20 countries29. 
 
The effectiveness of the TIEAs agreements is in doubt30. Between the years 2006 
and 2010, 5,111 information requests were exchanged between the U.S. and other 
countries31. However, only 894 were outgoing requests32. Several factors can explain the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Id. 
26 Id ; see also Jackson, Randall, Brown Pushes U.K. Tax Havens on OECD Standards.( Tax Notes International 54 
(3)), at 180-181. 
27 Chris Horton, The UBS/IRS Settlement Agreement and Cayman Island Hedge Funds, (University of Miami Inter-
American Law Review, Volume 41, Number 3, 357, 2010) at 372.  
28 See IRS, The Tax Gap and International Taxpayers, February 2008 (Last Updated 10 Dec 2013), 
http://www.irs.gov/irm/part5/irm_05-021-002.html (“The U.S.  has over 60 bilateral tax treaties with other 
countries, and over 20 Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEA) in effect with various countries and 
jurisdictions where a bilateral tax treaty is not in place.  These treaties and agreements facilitate the 
exchange of information, and generally allow for mutual assistance for both civil and criminal 
investigations. The tax treaties allow for information exchange by specific request, and in most cases, 
through spontaneous and automatic exchanges as well”). 
29 Id. 
30 Jane G. Gravelle, supra note 14, at 22. 
31 United State Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report to the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, IRS’s Information Exchanges with Other 
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low number of outgoing requests. First, “as pointed out by Avi-Yonah, most of these 
agreements are restricted to criminal matters, which are a minor part of the revenues involved and 
pose difficult issues of evidence” 33. Second is the complexity of the information that the 
IRS agent is required to provide34. A review of the agreements reveals that the IRS must 
provide a specific taxpayer name in order to retrieve any information. Moreover, the IRS 
needs to provide the reason that the taxpayer is under investigation. For instance, the U.S. 
signed a TIEA with the Cayman Islands in 2004. According to the TIEA, the U.S. must 
provide very specific information to the Cayman Islands in order to get information about 
a U.S. taxpayer. As a result, the TIEA is more of a confirmation, rather than discovery 
tool35.  
 
In addition to tax treaties, in 2001 the IRS established the “QI Program”36. Under 
the program, a qualified intermediate (such as a bank) is required to identify the payment, 
and in some types of investments – where the beneficiary is a U.S. resident or any profit 
that is subject to withholding37 – the bank should notify the IRS about the transaction 
without disclosing the name of the taxpayer38. In return, the banks are required to 
withhold any tax amount and send the payment to the U.S. treasury39. After the UBS 
Scheme40 the effectiveness of the program was questioned41. Although the UBS was a 
QI, instead of discovering the identity of the beneficiary account, they created shell 
companies for their clients in the Cayman Islands in order to hide their identities. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Countries Could Be Improved through Better Performance Information, September 2009, 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/585299.pdf [hereinafter GAO Report]. 
32 Id. 
33 Jane G. Gravelle, supra note 14, at 22. 
34 GAO Report, supra note 31, at 8 -11.   
35 Chris Horton supra note 27, at 373 
36 Morse, Susan C., Qualified Intermediary or Bust? (August 3, 2009). Tax Notes, Vol. 124, No. 5, 2009; Santa Clara 
Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2009, at 471-474. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1444291 
37 See I.R.C. § 862(A), 871(A). (For more information). 
38 Morse, Susan C. supra note 36. 
39 Lynnley Browning, U.S. tax agency to strengthen program to catch offshore tax evasion, July. 15, 2008 N.Y Times, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/15/business/worldbusiness/15iht-15tax.14499852.html 
40 Lynnley Browning, U.S. Ends Inquiry of UBS Over Offshore Tax Evasion, Nov. 16, 2010 N.Y Times, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/17/business/17tax.html 
41 Jane G. Gravelle, supra note 14, at 22. 
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The war against offshore tax evasion is far from ending. However, it seems that 
today more than ever, a U.S. taxpayer will think twice before using an offshore 
jurisdiction in order to avoid taxes, so as not to risk the potential of sanctions arising from 
the cooperation of foreign banks or jurisdictions with the IRS. For example, after the 
UBS case, the UBS agreed in 2009 to disclose about 4,450 American clients suspected of 
using the bank’s offshore services to evade taxes42. 
 
Assistance in the Collection of Taxes 
 
As the world becomes global, tax collection is becoming more complex. Even if a 
country has determined the right to tax liabilities of its taxpayers, collection can be a 
difficult task. In the event that a taxpayer is devoid of any assets in the country that is 
trying to make the collection, very limited solutions are available to that country. Any 
attempt to collect taxes through another country will be considered a violation of the 
other country’s territory43. 
 
Assistance in the collection of taxes has a long history in international and 
American law. In 1955, in the case of India V. Taylor44, the government of India sought 
taxes from a company registered in the United Kingdom, but trading in India. The House 
of Lords held that India cannot enforce its collection of taxes through a British court. 
 
“My own opinion is that there is a well-recognized rule, which has been 
enforced for at least 200 years or thereabouts, under which these courts 
will not collect the taxes of foreign States for the benefit of the sovereigns 
of those foreign States; and this is one of those actions which these courts 
will not entertain.” 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Lynnley Browning, “14,700 Disclosed Offshore Accounts,” New York Times, Nov. 17, 2009 available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/18/business/global/18irs.html 
43 Kevin Jestin supra note 21 at 3. 
44 Government of India, Ministry of Finance (Revenue Division) v. Taylor, [1955] A.C. 491; 
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In United States V. Harden45 (1963), the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of California held for a deficiency of $639,500.15 against the 
respondent, Mr. Harden, for the years 1945-1946. When the U.S. tried to enforce the 
judgment they could not locate any assets of the respondent in U.S. jurisdiction. 
Therefore, the U.S tried to enforce the judgment against the respondent in a Canadian 
court, claiming that this was a contract that the Canadian court was required to enforce. 
The supreme court of Canada held that no Canadian court would enforce the revenue 
laws of another country. 
 
“Similarly, in my opinion, the argument that the claim asserted is simply 
for the performance of an agreement, made for good consideration, to pay 
a stated sum of money must also fail. We are concerned not with form but 
with substance, and if it can properly be said that the respondent made an 
agreement it was simply an agreement to pay taxes which by the laws of 
the foreign state she was obligated to pay.” 
 
The non-enforcement of foreign public judgments is a taboo in law history46. 
Although countries may enforce private judgments in fields like torts and contracts, when 
they are faced with a request to force foreign judgments in fields like criminal, antitrust 
and tax, the request will be denied47. The obvious result is a decrease in the ability of 
countries to enforce their laws even when public policy is not an issue. 
  
  The reasons for the aforementioned phenomenon are varied48. According to 
Johnson, Alan, and Lawrence the efforts by one country to enforce its law on public 
issues within the territory of another may “constitute an extraterritorial intrusion”49.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 United States Of America V. Esperanza p. Harden, [1963] S.C.R. 366; 1963 S.C.R. LEXIS 37. 
46 Dodge, William S., Breaking the Public Law Taboo. Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 43, Winter 2002. 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=316660 
47 Id. 
48 Alan R. Johnson, Lawrence Nirenstein, and Stephen E. Wells, Reciprocal Enforcement of Tax Claims Through Tax 
Treaties, Tax Lawyer Vol. 33 No. 2, (1979)at 470. Available at 
http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/txlr33&div=4&id=&page= 
49 Id. 
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Although international tax practice has evolved dramatically in the last decades50, it 
seems that the cooperation of countries on a voluntary basis is limited and subject to 
complex and uncertain processes. 
 
Multilateral conventions for Tax Collection Assistance 
 
Due to a historic problem of tax collection by countries within a foreign country, 
jurisdiction countries have began to sign mutual agreements. 
 
The first agreement can be found at the beginning of 1950, as a multilateral 
convention among the Benelux51 countries for tax collection assistance52. Under the 
convention, the Benelux countries agreed to enforce the collection of tax in their territory 
for the foreign country. In 1972, the Nordic convention was signed with similar 
principles53. Following the success of the Nordic convention in 1988, the OECD started 
to draft a new convention that was intended to	   break the historical barrier of lack of 
cooperation between the countries in collecting taxes54. At first, the successfulness of the 
convention was very limited, with only a few countries having signed the convention55. 
Two decades later, in 2008, the OECD opened the convention on Mutual Administrative 
Assistance in Tax Matters (MAATM)56 for signature. In less than two years, about 50 
countries signed the MAATM convention. It should be noted that the MAATM 
convention results in major cooperation among countries due to the creation of a global 
network that deals with tax evasions cases, making it harder and more unprofitable.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, International Tax as International Law 7 (U. Mich. Law Sch. Pub. Law 
Research Paper 41, Mich. Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 04-007, 2004), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=516382 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.516382 (For the evaluation and the impact of 
the international law on the practice) 
51 A collective name for Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, esp. with reference to their economic union 
52 Kevin Jestin, supra note 21, at 3. 
53 Kevin Jestin, supra note 21, at 3-4. 
54 Kevin Jestin, supra note 21. At 4. 
55OECD, Background brief: The Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters and New Protocol, 
June 5, 2012, http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-
information/backgroundbrieftheconventiononmutualadministrativeassistanceintaxmattersandnewprotocol.htm 
[hereinafter MAATM Background] 
56 See MAATM, supra note 9 ; See also OECD, Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-tax-information/conventiononmutualadministrativeassistanceintaxmatters.htm 
(For more information regarding the MAATM) 
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The model of the MAATM convention is based on a combination of tax exchange 
provisions and administrative assistance in the collection of taxes. Under the model, 
countries that have signed the convention enjoy “cross-border tax co-operation including 
exchange of information, multilateral simultaneous tax examinations, service of 
documents, and cross-border assistance in tax collection, while imposing extensive 
safeguards to protect the confidentiality of the information exchanged”57. The main 
purpose of the convention is to create a worldwide network of countries that will, in some 
cases, share automatic / per request information about potential tax evasion, and in some 
cases collection of taxes within the foreign jurisdiction as well.  
 
One advantage, which can also be a disadvantage, is the flexibility that the 
convention offers to countries by reserving the right to provide no information or 
assistance in the collection of taxes58. For example, a country can exclude the collection 
of taxes in its jurisdiction either at the time of signing, at the time of ratification, or at a 
later date59. An illustration of this is Poland’s withdrawal of its reservations concerning 
assistance in collection of taxes when it joined the EU60.   
 
Open questions that this paper does not address are the practical adaptation of the 
convention, and the way that countries enforce the convention. 
 
Bilateral Conventions 
 
   Article 27 – The U.S Treaties in Practice vs. the OECD Model 
 
The MAATM convention operates at the international level, similar to other 
conventions such as the Geneva Convention (multilateral conventions). Another 
traditional way to address tax issues among countries is through bilateral conventions. A 
quick overview of the U.S model tax convention of 2006 reveals that there is no reference 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57MAATM Background, supra note 55. 
58 Article 30 of the  MAATM , supra note 56. 
59 OECD, MAATM’s flyer (June. 5, 2013),	  http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-
information/ENG_Convention_Flyer.pdf.  
60 Id.; See also Article 30 of the  MAATM, supra note 58. 
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to assistance in the collection of taxes. Nevertheless, in practice the U.S. signed treaties 
that include an article relating to assistance in collection of taxes in a foreign country61. 
 
The provisions that are related to the collection of taxes can be divided logically 
into two types62, a “General Enforcement” and a “Limited Enforcement”63. A “general 
enforcement” is general mutual assistance in the collection of taxes within a foreign 
country. 
 
  The “general enforcement” provision is found in treaties with Canada, Denmark, 
France, The Netherlands and Sweden64.  A review of paragraph 1 of Article 27 of the 
convention between the U.S. and Sweden65 reveals that the assistance in collection 
applies to any type of tax that is covered by Article 2. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 27 
note that in the event a country files66 a tax claim against a person’s assets in another 
country, the latter country will enforce the claim as if the liability were in its jurisdiction.  
Article 27 is a fly in the ointment; paragraph 4 sets out that “the assistance provided by 
the article shall not be accorded with respect to the citizens, companies, or other entities 
of the state to which the application is made, except when the enforcement is against a 
person who enjoyed the convention although he was not entitled to”. 
 
It’s worth noting that the application of Article 27 is different from treaty to 
treaty. For instance, under the tax convention between the U.S. and Canada67, Article 27 
is worded differently. Under Article 1568 of the U.S-Canada tax convention the article is 
not applicable against a Canadian citizen if at the date of the tax deficiency, the taxpayer 
was a citizen of the Canada. Therefore, today the United States would have won the case 
of United States V. Harden. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 IRS, Part 5. Collecting Process, http://www.irs.gov/irm/part5/irm_05-021-002.html 
62 Alan R. Johnson, Lawrence Nirenstein, and Stephen E. Wells, supra note 48 at 472. 
63 Alan R. Johnson, Lawrence Nirenstein, and Stephen E. Wells, supra note 48 at 473. 
64 IRS, Part 5. Collecting Process, supra note 61. 
65 The Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income Treaty 
art. 27, U.S.-Swed., Jan. 1, 1996. Available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-trty/sweden.pdf 
66 See IRM 5.1.8.7.7, Incoming Mutual Collection Assistance Requests regarding mutual collection assistance requests, 
http://www.irs.gov/irm/part5/irm_05-001-008r.html (For the procedure of filing a claim). 
67 Treaty Concerning the Avoidance of Double Taxation, U.S.-Canada art. 15, Aug. 16, 1987. Available at  
68 Article 15 Under the Canadian convention is equivalent to Article 27 under the Swedish convention – “Assistance in 
Collection”	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Due to the fact that the U.S. was among the first countries to sign the MAATM 
convention in 198869, it raises the question of why the United States does not include a 
uniform version of Article 27 in its income tax convention model. One hypothesis that 
comes to mind is the existence of the ITEA agreements. However, the answer is hidden 
in the late 60’s when a broad collection of provisions was deleted from the U.S model70. 
Three hypotheses can explain the withdrawal of the provisions: 1) the IRS performed 
very limited collection abroad under the five treaties that included “general enforcement” 
provisions71. 2) In our opinion, during the years following World War II, countries were 
more sensitive to measures that could be expressed as a foothold in their territory. 3) 
There was a development of independent agreements that are more limited, as described 
above. As a result, the U.S entered a collection provision only where a convention was 
re-negotiated and assistance of tax collection provisions were included72.   
 
“Limited enforcement” is assistance in collection of taxes where a person or entity enjoys 
the benefits provided by the treaty, even though they are not entitled. As a result, the 
application of the provision is narrow and limited to very specific situations, as described 
above73. A “limited enforcement” paragraph can be found under the U.S.-Iceland 
convention74.  
 
“Each of the Contracting States shall endeavor to collect on behalf of the other 
Contracting State such amounts as may be necessary to ensure that relief granted 
by the Convention from taxation imposed by that other State does not inure to the 
benefit of persons not entitled thereto”75. 
 
A similar approach can be found under the treaties with Luxemburg (1996), Germany 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69	  The U.S. have signed the MAATAM Convention but not yet ratified it.	  
70 Van de Vijver, Anne, ed., The New US-Belgium Double Tax Treaty: A Belgian and EU Perspective. Larcier, 2009.. 
Page 558. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Alan R. Johnson, Lawrence Nirenstein, and Stephen E. Wells, supra note 48 at 475-476. 
74 Treaty Concerning the Avoidance of Double Taxation, U.S.-Iceland., Oct. 23, 2007. Available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/Treaty-Iceland-10-23-2007.pdf [hereinafter 
“U.S.-Iceland Treaty”] 
75See U.S.-Iceland Treaty, Par. 5, Art. 25 ; See also Van de Vijver, Anne, ed., supra note 70 
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(1989), Austria (1996), the U.K (2001) or Belgium76. 
 
Article 27 under the OECD Model of the Tax Convention On Income and Capital 
 
In January 2003 the OECD added Article 27 concerning “The Assistance in The 
Collection of Taxes”. Article 27 lays out a set of rules for contracting parties who wish to 
collaborate in collecting taxes within the other State. A brief review of the article reveals 
a painstaking job.  
 
Under paragraph 1 of the article, a country will provide assistance to the other country 
upon a request to collect taxes within the foreign country. According to the 
Commentaries on the Articles of the Model Tax Convention (CAMTC), paragraph 1 is 
very flexible and is subject to negotiation among the contracting countries, based on their 
local law. In addition, according to the CAMTC the article is an elective.  
 
The collection of taxes is not limited to the type of taxes covered by Article 2 and most 
importantly, are also enforceable against people who are not entitled to the benefits 
derived from the convention.  
 
Paragraph 4 of the Article allows a contracting country to require temporary relief before 
a final judgment is made against the taxpayer in order to safeguard future collection. The 
aforementioned provision combined with paragraph 6 of the Article is very interesting. 
According to paragraph 6, the “validity or the amount of a revenue claim of a Contracting 
State shall not be brought before the courts or administrative bodies of the other 
Contracting State”. An interesting question is whether paragraph 6 should also apply in 
the case where temporary relief is provided (e.g. seizure), and whether the foreign court 
has the right to determine whether the request is reasonable on the strength of the 
evidence. A review of the CAMTC supports the hypothesis that any judicial proceeding 
will take place in the country that asks for assistance in the collection of taxes. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Van de Vijver, Anne, ed., supra note 70. 
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 Conclusion   
 
This paper reviewed the development of the exchange of information on tax 
matters and the assistance in the collection of taxes between countries. As detailed in the 
study, the history and the present show that countries are faced with sophisticated 
taxpayers who wish to reduce their income using artificial methods77. As a result, a dual 
problem arises. First, due to globalization countries should locate the foreign income of 
their taxpayers. The problem is that taxpayers are hidden behind shell companies in some 
tax haven 100% of the time. Second, even when the country has managed to track the 
income and the beneficiary of the income, it has a problem collecting the tax if no assets 
are located within its jurisdiction. Consequently, over the years, countries have been 
attempting, both on their own and with the help of treaty models in particular, to provide 
a solution in the form of bilateral agreements. However, most of the current agreement 
are limited in their application, or too complex to carry out. In addition, in some of the 
agreements as described above, countries have a very limited range of operation. 
 
As this article demonstrates, the ability to force the collection of taxes worldwide 
by countries is critical in today’s world. However, the question remains as to whether 
bilateral conventions and agreements are the keys to the solution. In our opinion, in a 
global economic world that is growing daily, a bilateral agreement among countries may 
win the battle but will lose the war against tax evasion. Indeed, tremendous efforts by 
countries are making people to think twice today before trying to avoid tax payment. 
However, when the exchange of information and the collection of tax is dependent on 
agreements between two countries, the possibility of detecting tax evasion by a taxpayer 
is very low. Even if we succeed in such a mission, locating assets in foreign countries 
other than the one with which the country has the agreement is not a valid option. 
 
Based on the analysis above, We are of the opinion that the US and OECD should 
abandon tax information exchange and administrative assistance under articles 26 and 27 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 As described in the UBS case. 
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of the tax treaties, as well as bilateral TIEAs and IGAs, and instead commit to the 
MAATM. 
 
Given the realities of today, adopting a multilateral model will create a worldwide 
network for the exchange of information, and will make it easier than ever to track 
suspicious transactions taking place in multi-jurisdictions. Once a country claims a tax 
deficiency, the locating of assets can be done in different states under a common 
electronic system. As a result, a smaller percentage of taxpayers will be willing to take 
the risk of getting caught and paying with “their own” capital and their own freedom. 
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